“Essentially Contested”:




There are no easy conventions for the creation of meaning.
Robert Cover, “Nomos and Narrative” (25)
In writing this introduction to “Law, Literature, Postcoloniality” I 
borrow the term “essentially contested” from W.B. Gallie’s Philosophy 
and the Historical Understanding as a resonant concept with which to 
mark the interlocking terrain addressed by these ten essays.1 Gallie’s 
analysis of essentially contested meanings privileges concepts emer-
gent within a fi eld of social engagement that give rise to confl icted sets 
of social values and divergent practices of interpretation which fail to 
achieve resolution through imposed principles of universal judgement. 
His examples of such terms include “art,” “democracy,” “religion,” and 
“social justice” (157), but the broader reach of his argument extends to 
the practical realm of human social activity in which these disputes vary 
according to their contested meanings. As he states, “concepts which are 
essentially contested [are] concepts the proper use of which inevitably 
involves endless disputes about their proper uses on the part of their 
users” (158). For Gallie, the apposite role of social criticism is to dis-
tinguish these terms as sites of communal interaction that by their very 
nature are irreducibly different from each other and cannot be resolved 
through the application of universal principles. As he explains, “if the 
notion of logical justifi cation can be applied only to such theses and ar-
guments as can be presumed capable of gaining universal agreement in 
the long run, the disputes to which the uses of any essentially contested 
concept give rise are not genuine or rational disputes at all” (183). What 
resonates as the force of the social in essentially contested terms is their 
ability to articulate the “essential contestedness [of ] our basic moral no-
tions and principles,” which matter to us, as Gallie claims, insofar as 
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they designate confl icts that gain their oppositional force in their “wide 
bearings upon human life” (190).
To consider the terms law, literature, postcoloniality as essentially 
contested according to Gallie’s defi nition necessitates a reassessment of 
these concepts in their broader engagements with social sites of discrep-
ant meaning-making. Given the array of cultural and political issues ad-
dressed here, these essays signal the urgency and signifi cance of such an 
undertaking. On the one hand, these papers challenge the interrelation-
ships between law, literature, and postcolonial analysis through their en-
gagements with contemporary issues that represent formative sites of 
contemporary cultural confl ict. They examine issues generated in the 
encounter of law with indigenous cultural practices (Bracken, Cheyfi tz, 
Karno), law in its manifestations through colonial governance (Mawani, 
Reichman), and law at the intersection of postcoloniality, violence, and 
legal ethics (Findlay, Gottlieb, Fitzpatrick). Their attention to law’s gener-
ative capacities signals the inescapability of law’s continuance at the “fore-
front of that very relation” in which the “West’s relation to its ‘other’” gets 
constituted and critically explored through the terrain of the postcolonial 
(Fitzpatrick and Darian-Smith 4). Yet, these essays also examine the in-
escapable violence of colonial confl icts by asking what form postcolonial 
legality might take in generating fundamental human rights and social 
justice. They address the uneasy relationship between human rights viola-
tions and colonial-imperial legacies to articulate the “becoming-time” of 
a postcolonial future that has yet to take shape (Patton, Ratti). 
On the other hand, these essays also participate in a broader critical 
practice that may be characterized according to the “world building” 
capacity that Robert Cover identifi es with law’s social and normative 
functions. For Cover, the legal system’s “professional paraphernalia of 
social control” represents but a small part of the wider legal habitus 
that articulates the “prescriptions,” “narratives,” “meanings,” “constitu-
tions,” “epics,” and “scriptures” of the “world in which we live” (4–5). 
Cover argues that this normative universe, which is so often taken up by 
the “formal institutions of law,” is also established through a generative 
“system of tension or a bridge linking a concept of reality to an imagined 
alternative” that extends beyond and challenges law’s seamless associa-
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tions with “justifi catory enterprises” (9). He claims for the world-build-
ing competencies of law a more utopian project of “alternity” which 
“entails the application of human will to an extant state of affairs as 
well as toward our visions of alternative futures” (9). An essential task in 
creating this future resides for Cover in our ability to formulate “legal 
meaning” in a two-fold initiative that not only provides the source for 
“a challenging enrichment of social life,” but also represents “a potential 
restraint on arbitrary power and violence” (68). 
The contradictions inherent in reformulating colonial laws to con-
struct an alternative site of justice and moral obligation are explored in 
several papers in this issue, which probes the capacity of imposed legal 
frameworks to realize postcolonial ends. As many of the essays show, the 
colonial past with its “jurisgenerative” narrativization of events contin-
ues to represent our inherited order or “normative world,” a world that 
Cover defi nes as staging the habitations of our “nomos,” in which “[w]e 
constantly create and maintain a world of right and wrong, of lawful 
and unlawful, of valid and void” (47, 4). Colonial legal inheritances 
persist in shaping and hierarchically ordering our social and legal world 
as essays by Christopher Bracken, Renisa Mawani, Eric Cheyfi tz, Ravit 
Reichmann, Isobel Findlay, and Jason Gottlieb demonstrate. These 
scholars reveal that the project of conceptualizing justice in the interests 
of the powerless rather than the powerful remains urgent, even as we 
have been forced to recognize our implication in global legal realities in 
which “the paradigm of universal human rights” are giving way to “the 
paradigm of trade-related, market-friendly human rights” (Baxi 552). In 
linking law, literature, and postcoloniality, contributors articulate a con-
ceptual shift that situates the postcolonial as a site of social positioning, 
one that varies across a spectrum of contiguous and uneven emplace-
ments that need to confront the “globalization of law” in its new forms 
of “legal imperialism” (552). In this regard, Peter Fitzpatrick’s engage-
ment with the challenges of articulating a form of postcoloniality legal-
ity is highly suggestive.
The active reworkings of the law and literature paradigm, in which 
several of these essays take part, are also enabling new understandings 
from which to assess the social embeddedness of both disciplines and 
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their contributions to the cause of social and legal redress. Essays by 
Paul Patton, Valerie Karno, and Manav Ratti examine how literature 
provides a means for investigating epistemological and hermeneutical 
questions, questions that are not only imperative to our postcolonial 
politics, but also add to the enrichment of our current theories about 
the relationships between colonizing and colonized peoples. Their con-
tributions focus on the capacities of literature to render visible the “un-
historical lives” (Ondaatje 59) that postcolonial writers have long been 
summoning to “refl ect on the meaning and achievement of justice” 
(Morawetz 451). The creative and interpretive dimensions of their con-
tributions shape and inform the transformational capacities that all of 
these essays propose in thinking together law, literature, postcoloniality. 
Collectively, the essays in this special issue participate in a continuing 
project that foregrounds the contested yet interrelated terrain of these 
terms while offering a necessary beginning point for further refl ection 
and analysis. 
Note
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